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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last few years, developments have occurred in litigation processes
that reflect larger revolutionary trends in information processing.2 These

* Assistant Professor, Willamette University College of Law; J.D., Loyola University
School of Law; B.S., Louisiana State University. I wish to thank Marie Ashe, Llewellyn
Gibbons, and Lynn Oreskovich for their help and support. I also wish to thank Vince Chiappetta,
Jennifer Friesen, James Nafziger, JeffStanden and Michael Wise for theirhelpful comments, and
Jennifer Gogert, Eugene Graff, Steve Marsh, and Jason Heym for their research assistance.
Financial support for this research was provided by the Willamette University College of Law.
** H.H. MUNRO, Crosscurrents,in THE BEST OF SAKI 17, 19 (3d prtg. 1963).
2. Various authors have recently examined the development of communication
technology and its effect on different aspects of our lives. See, e.g., FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE
DEATHOFDISTANCE: HowTHE COMMUNICATIONSREVOLUTIONWILLCHANGEOURLIVES (1997);
MICHAELL. DERTOUZOS, WHATWILLBE: HOwTHENEwWORLD OF INFORMATIONWILL CHANGE
OUR LIVES (1997); ESTHER DYSON, RELEASE 2.0: A DESIGN FOR LIVING IN THE DIGITAL AGE
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developments have included movements towards electronic court filings, the
admission of electronic documents as evidence, and expanded notions of
service of process. This Article focuses on the issues raised in considering the
feasibility of electronic or e-mail3 service of process to give defendants notice
of legal proceedings instituted against them in United States courts.
Part II provides a historical overview of due process constraints in giving
notice to a defendant. Part I examines the benefits and limitations of
traditional methods of service currently prevailing under state and federal law.
Part IV details a recent British court's permission of electronic service on a
defendant whose whereabouts were unknown. Part V discusses judicial
examples in the United States of the integration of electronic technology into
the litigation process. Part VI argues that electronic service should be permitted
in a particular range of civil cases, namely those in which the defendants have
established a connection to an e-mail address such that the electronic service
of process is reasonably calculated to apprise defendants of the actions against
them.
II. WHAT PROCESS ISDUE?
Historically, service of process on a defendant's person within the territory
of the forum state established a court's physical power over the defendant,
subjecting the defendant to the court's jurisdiction.4 This territorial concept of
jurisdiction, endorsed by the United States Supreme Court inPennoyerv. Neffs
gave rise to the rule that a court's jurisdiction could be established by service
(1997); STEVENJOHNSON, INTERFACE CULTURE: HowNEwTECHNOLOGYTRANSFORMSTHEWAY
WE CREATE AND COMMUNICATE (1997); CHucKMARTIN, THE DIGITAL ESTATE: STRATEGIES FOR

COMPETING, SURVIVING, AND THRIVING IN AN INTERNETWORKED WORLD (1997); NICHOLAS
NEGROPONTE, BEINGDIGITAL (1995); DAVID SHENK, DATASMOG: SURVIVINGTHEINFORMATION
GLUT (1997); see also JAMES GLEICK, FASTER: THE ACCELERATION OF JUSTABOUrEVERYTHING

(1999) (examining alleged benefits of increased speed in performance of daily activities). For
a thoughtful discussion of the problems presented by the Internet as a forum for free speech and
the application of regulatory mechanisms to communications in cyberspace, see Llewellyn
Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social
EnforcementorSocialContractingforGovernance in Cyberspace,6 CORNELLJ.L. &PUB. POL'Y
475 (1997).
3. The terms "electronic mail" and "e-mail" are used interchangeably throughout this
Article. Electronic mail ("e-mail") is a nearly instantaneous transmission through the Internet.
After the sender types the message into a computer, the e-mail message travels to the sender's
server, which forwards the message to the Internet. In order to avoid traffic congestion on the
Internet, the message is separated into smaller sections, and then reassembled after it reaches the
server ofthe recipient. After arriving at the recipient's e-mailbox, the message may be retrieved.
See PRESTON GRALLA, How THE INTERNET WORKS 78-83 (4th ed. 1998).

4. This notion derived from common law, whereby service of process of a civil
lawsuit was obtained by arresting the defendant pursuant to a writ of capiasad respondendum.
The defendant could obtain his release from prison only by posting a bond in guarantee of
payment of a prospective judgment in the pending action. See ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION
INCIVIL ACTIONS § 2.02[2] [a] (2d ed. 1991).
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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of process on a defendant only within the forum state.6
In PennoyerNeff sued in a federal court in Oregon to recover a tract of
Oregon land over which he claimed ownership.7 Pennoyer, who was occupying
the land, claimed title to it under a sheriff's deed issued pursuant to the sale of
the land in satisfaction of an Oregon state court judgment against Neff.8 Neff,
who was not a resident of Oregon, received notice of the relevant state court
proceedings not by personal service, but through publication.9 When he failed
to appear in Oregon state court, the court entered a default judgment against
0

him.1

In the federal court action, Neff asserted that publication did not constitute
service adequate to establish the Oregon state court's jurisdiction over him, and
the default judgment entered against him was therefore void."1 In its analysis
of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment due process
requirement regarding state court jurisdiction over a party, the Court in
Pennoyer stated:
[E]very state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory.... [N]o State
can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory. [citations omitted] The several
States are of equal dignity and authority, and the
independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all
others. And so it is... that no tribunal established by [a
State] can extend its process beyond that territory so as to
subject either persons or property to its decisions. 2
Thus, Pennoyerestablished that a state would have power to adjudicate a claim
over a nonresident defendant only if the plaintiff could personally serve the
defendant or attach his property within the forum state. 3

6. Id. at 720. In Pennoyer the Court stated the principle that a court could not
exercise personaljurisdiction when "in an action formoney or damages... a defendant does not
appear in the court and is not found within the State, and is not a resident thereof..." Id. Until
the middle of this century, courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if
the defendant was (1) domiciled or resided in the forum state, (2) consented to jurisdiction, or
(3) was served with process in the forum state. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHURR. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064 (2d. ed. 1987).
7. Pennoyer,95 U.S. at 719.
8. Id.
9. The circuit court ordered notice of the action by publication of the summons during
six successive weeks in the PACIFIC CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE, a weekly newspaper of general
circulation published in Multnomah County, Oregon. Id. at 717.
10. Id. at 720.
11. Id. at 721.
12. Id. at 722.
13. Id. at 723. The Court recognized, however, that a defendant could consent to
jurisdiction by waiving his defense to a lack ofjurisdiction. Id. at 725.
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In the years following the Supreme Court's opinion inPennoyer,advances
in transportation and communication technology allowed personal mobility to
expand, and absence from one's home state became a more common
occurrence. 4 As aresult, the territorial doctrine ofpersonaljurisdictionbecame
increasingly inadequate, and Pennoyer's "physical power" philosophy of
jurisdiction pursuant to service of process became restrictive and outdated. 5 In
1950 the United States Supreme Court relaxed the physical presence standard
enunciated in Pennoyer 6 In Mullane v. CentralHanoverBank & Trust Co., 7
the Court shifted in its interpretation of due process requirements for adequate
notice and focused on fairness and reasonableness in giving a defendant notice
of a pending legal action.' 8
The action in Mullane involved judicial settlements by a trustee, Central
Hanover Bank ("Hanover"), of a three million dollar common trust fund
established underNew York banking laws.'9 The fund, which contained a pool
of 113 individual trust estates, had been established in order to facilitate the
investment administration of the numerous small trusts.2" Approximately one
year after establishing the common trust fund, Hanover petitioned the New
York Surrogate Court for settlement of its first accounting, as required by state
law.2' Thereafter, Hanover published a notice ofthe pending proceedings.22 The
notice did not contain the names of any of the trust beneficiaries, some of
whom were nonresidents of New York.' It appeared in a local newspaper, and
was published once weekly during four successive weeks. 24 Kenneth Mullane

14. In McGee v. InternationalLifeInsurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the United
States Supreme Court noted the "transformation of [the] national economy," evidencing an
increase in interstate business as well as in individual mobility:
Today many commercial transactions touch two or
more States and may involve parties separated by the
full continent. With this increasing nationalization of
commerce has come a great increase in the amount of
business conducted by mail across state lines. At the
same time modem transportation and communication
have made it much less burdensome for a party sued
to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity.
Id. at 222-23.
15. In 1945 the United States Supreme Courtin InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945), rejected the physical power theory of personal jurisdiction, and
found that a corporation's business contacts with the forum state established a "presence"
sufficient to establish the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the forum.
16. 95 U.S. at 722.
17. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
18. Id. at 314-17.
19. Id. at 309.
20. Id. at 308-09.
21. Id. at 309.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 309-10.
24. Id.
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was then appointed guardian of the common trust fund on behalf of all income
beneficiaries that were not otherwise represented by legal counsel."
Subsequently, Mullane challenged the New York court's jurisdiction on the
grounds that notice to the beneficiaries by publication did not comport with due
process requirements.26
In Mullane the United States Supreme Court held that notice is sufficient
under due process requirements when individuals whose interests are at stake
in legal proceedings are provided with notice reasonably calculated to apprise
them of an action, thereby affording those persons an opportunity to present a
defense.2 The type of notice given must be such as to reasonably convey the
relevant information, and it must allow the defendant a reasonable time to make
an appearance.28 Further, the adequacy of notice is determinedby balancing the
private interest sought to be protected and the need to notify all interested
parties against the interest of the notice giver and the difficulty or impossibility
of such notification.29
Applying this analysis in Mullane, the Court found that notice by
publication was not reasonably calculated to notify those beneficiaries whose
names and addresses the trustee had or could reasonably ascertain.30 Regarding
the beneficiaries whose addresses were unknown, the Court deemed notice by
publication sufficient because there was no other method of notifying them.31
Because each of the beneficiaries had individual interests in the integrity of the
fund and in the fidelity of the trustee, the Court reasoned that notice reasonably
certain to reach most of those interested in objecting was likely to safeguard the

25. Id. at 310. Mullane was charged with protecting the rights of the beneficiaries in
the integrity of the fund and ensuring the fidelity of the trustee. Id. at 319.
26. Id. at 311. Notice and jurisdiction are separate concepts that should be
distinguished. A court's jurisdiction over a party enables it to adjudicate an action affecting that
party's rights and to render a judgment which binds that party. Notice effectuated through
service of process is distinguishable from personal jurisdiction in that it is a procedural
requirement imposed on the plaintiff to bring the party under the court's jurisdiction. See
generally CASAD, supra note 4, § 1.01 [1]-[2](b) (providing a basic explanation of the concept
of jurisdiction). Further, service of process does not preclude a party from objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over her person. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) ("A defendant who
waives service of a summons does not thereby waive any objection to the venue or to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.").
27. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. The United States Supreme Court noted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "at a minimum... require[s] that deprivation of
life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case." Id. at 313.
28. Id. at 314.
29. Id. at 313-14.
30. Id. at 318. The Court held, however, that newspaper publication alone was
insufficient "not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because under the circumstances
it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at
hand." Id. at 319; see also Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983)
(discussing that notice by publication might not be sufficient when the identity of creditors is
reasonably ascertainable).
31. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317-18.
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interests of all.32 The Court noted in a subsequent case that due process does
not require perfection:
[T]he Due Process Clause has neverbeen construed to require
that the procedures used to guard against an erroneous
deprivation of aprotectible "property" or "liberty" interest be
so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error. The
Due Process Clause simply does not mandate that all
governmental decisionmaking comply with standards that
assure perfect, error-free determinations.33
Although the Mullane decision arose in the limited context of proceedings
involving a common trust fund, in post-Mullane cases the Supreme Court has
made it clear that in all types of actions, efforts at giving notice to a defendant
must exhibit fundamental fairness and must establish a reasonableprobability
of actual notice.34 Today, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Mullane" continues to provide the standard for what notice is due under the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although
Mullane employs a rigorous standard for compliance with due process in the
provision of notice to interested parties, the standard of fairness and
reasonableness articulated by the United States Supreme Court provides for a

32. Id. at 319.
33. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
34. 339 U.S. at 318. Because Mullane set forth the requirement that an attempt at
notice mustbe "reasonable under the circumstances," the Court has applied this standard widely
in other types of actions, such as (1) condemnation proceedings, Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) (finding that notice by newspaper publication was insufficient when
it was possible to give direct notice to property owners); (2) eminent domain actions, Schroeder
v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1962) (holding that publication and posting were
insufficient when the names and addresses of riparian owners were discoverable with relative
ease); and (3) forcible entry and detainer actions, Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 452-53
(1982) (finding that posting notice on the tenant's apartment door was not constitutionally
sufficient when only one effort was made at personal service, and notice was not mailed to the
tenant).
35. 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see also City ofWest Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234,241
(1999) (holding that the Constitution does not mandate that state or local entities give specific,
detailed instructions to owners seeking the return of property lawfully seized, but no longer
needed for investigative or prosecutorial purposes); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 166-70
(1996) (denying that petitioner was deprived of due process by commonwealth's failure to give
him notice of the evidence it would introduce at the sentencing phase of his trial); Richards v.
Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 805 (1996) (finding that prior litigation did not, as a matter of
federal due process, bar petitioners from challenging a claimed unconstitutional deprivation of
their property); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 707 (1988)
(finding that the Hague Convention is not implicated when service on a domestic agent is valid
under both state law and the Due Process Clause); Tulsa Prof I Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope,
485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988) (holding that state's probate law providing notice by publication did
not satisfy the Due Process Clause when creditor's identity "was known or 'reasonably
ascertainable"').
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flexible and reasonable approach to the determination of what constitutes
adequate notice.
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS

Notice of a legal action to a defendant is achieved by service of process
and is primarily conducted by mailing or other physical delivery of the

complaint and summons to the defendant personally or to someone authorized
by law to receive process on behalf of the defendant. 6 Posting and publication

of notice are also constitutionally sufficient in certain circumstances.37
The presently utilized mechanisms for service of process are often blandly

ritualistic and unattended by objection or controversy. Sometimes, however,
service ofprocess is not efficient, expedient, or effective in delivering adequate
notice, and challenges to the sufficiency of service of process expose
shortcomings inherent in traditional methods for giving notice.38 Similarly
apparent is the sometimes tedious and reductive judicial focus on whether the
service of process demonstrates an actual physical connection between a
process server 9 and the recipient of the legal documents, 4' where and with
whom a defendant "resides,"'" and whether process servers have properly
conducted interrogations to establish the authorization of a party to receive

36. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 1074; see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)
(authorizing service of process either: (1) on an individual personally; (2) at the individual's
home on a person of suitable age residing in the home; or (3) on an authorized agent of the
individual); FED. R. Civ.P. 4(h)(1) (authorizing service ofprocess on a corpoi'ation, partnership,
or other unincorporated association by serving an officer, a managing or general agent of the
corporation, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service).
37. See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1982) (recognizing
appropriateness ofposting in some instances when person cannotbe served personally); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,317 (1950) (deeming publication sufficient
when it is the only method ofnotice available to plaintiff); Wille v. Castro, 490 So. 2d 250,251
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding constitutionality of Florida statute allowing service of
process by publication of rule to show cause in forfeiture proceedings); City of New York v.
Chemical Bank, 470 N.Y.S.2d. 280, 284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (noting with approval the
constitutionality of New York statute allowing "nail and mail" service where personal service
could not be made by due diligence).
38. See discussionsupraPart II.
39. The term "process server" as used herein refers to any person authorized by the
federal rules or state statutes to perform service of process. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)
(stating that "[s]ervice may be effected by any person who is not a party and who is at least 18
years of age ....[T]he court may direct that service be effected by a United States marshal,
deputy United States marshal, orotherperson or officer specially appointed by the court for that
purpose.").
40. See, e.g., Weiss v. Glemp, 903 P.2d 455, 457 (Wash. 1995) (holding invalid
service of process left on windowsill within view of the defendant at his home).
41. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Fettig, 919 P.2d 1209,1211 (Wash. 1996) (upholding service
on defendant's brother at her parents' home although defendant had a separate residence, but
often used her parents' address).
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service on behalf of the defendant.42 Some factual scenarios and subsequent
legal opinions attending plaintiffs' attempts at notice echo the overly restrictive
doctrine of Pennoyer,43 exposing the need for a method of serving process that
avoids the inherent physical limitations of the present scheme.
An aspirational model for service of process is one in which a party, upon
her physical, in-person receipt of a summons and complaint, accepts those
papers and signs a receipt documenting the transaction, allowing the litigation
to proceed without delay. Because personal service on a defendant is not
always possible, the law recognizes circumstances in which a defendant is
deemed to have received notice through "substituted" or "constructive" service
of process. Regardless of how service ofprocess is made, each method requires
an actual physical exchange of documents between the notice sender and the
intended recipient. This section will examine the various methods available
under federal and state practices on effecting service ofprocess and will further
explore the benefits and limitations of those models.
A. PersonalService
Personal service is effected by delivery to the defendant of the summons
and complaint by a person authorized by law and is deemed the most reliable
manner of giving a defendant notice of a legal action in which the defendant
has an interest." Although plaintiffs favor this type of service because of its
certainty, defendants' challenges to plaintiffs' attempts at personal service
expose the difficulty of achieving the physical contact between process server
and defendant necessary to comply with the requirements of applicable service
of process statutes. 45
One example is Weiss v. Glemp,4 in which the Washington Supreme Court
decided that a summons left on the windowsill ofa rectory did not comply with

42. See, e.g., Stull v. Hoke, 957 P.2d 173, 178 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
receptionist oflaw firm was not a proper recipient ofservice on behalf of defendant law firm that
was a general partnership when the receptionist was not an authorized agent for the partnership).
43. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
44. "Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is the classic form of
notice always adequate in any type of proceeding." Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
45. Some courts have held, however, that "in hand" delivery is not required to
effectuatepersonal service. See, e.g.,Novakv. World Bank, 703 F.2d 1305, 1310 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (noting that service may be effected on a person evading service by leaving papers near
that person) (citing Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 457 (9th Cir. 1956)); Heritage House Frame
& Moulding Co. v. Boyce Highlands Furniture Co., 88 F.R.D. 172, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)),
Williams v. Harris, No. Civ.A.88-0586-OG, 1988 WL 78849, at *1 (D.D.C. July 21, 1988)
(upholding personal service under Rule (4)(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when
summons and complaint were left at the door of a defendant's home who purposefully evaded
service, and defendant was subsequently seen taking legal papers inside the home).
46. 903 P.2d 455 (Wash. 1995).
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the state statutory requirement ofpersonal service to the defendant.' There, the
process server had attempted service at a rectory where the defendant, a
resident of Poland, was staying while visiting Seattle.' After twice being
rebuffed by two priests at the door of the rectory, the process server spotted the
defendant sitting near a window inside the rectory.49 The process server then
approached the window and, holding the documents high in his hand, yelled,
"Jozef Glemp, Oficjaline dostarcham [official documents]! JozefGlemp[,] you
have been served!"5 The defendant looked over his shoulder at the process
server, but apparently did not respond." The process server then left the
documents on a concrete windowsill about four feet from where the defendant
was sitting.52
Arguably, the service in Glemp was reasonably calculated to provide notice
to the defendant and, thus, was constitutionally adequate. 53 However, the
attempt at notice was deemed defective because, regardless of the papers'
actual proximity to the defendant, service of process did not meet the state
statute's requirements that the papers be delivered to the defendant personally
or left with someone of suitable age and discretion at his abode.54 There, a
"phalanx of priests" and a rectory window thwarted the efforts of the process
server, who was otherwise within the view and hearing of the defendant.55
Glemp exemplifies the limitations of personal service in its requirement, as
interpreted by that court, of physically leaving process not just near, but with,
the defendant.56

47. Id. at 457.
48. Id. at 456.
49. Id.
50. Id.The opinion's statement that Glemp was a Polish resident, and an interpreter's
presence during the attempt at service, indicate that English was not Glemp's native language.
Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 457-58.
54. Id. at 459. The court pointed out that adequate notice requires that a plaintiff
comply not only with constitutional due process requirements, but she must also meet the
requirements of the applicable service of process statute. Id. at 458-59 (citing Thayer v.
Edmonds, 503 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972)). In Glemp the applicable Washington
service of process statute provided, in pertinent part: "The summons shall be served by
deliveringa copy thereof... to the defendant personally ..."WASH. REv.CODE § 4.28.080 (15)
(Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
55. Glemp, 903 P.2d at 456.
56. See id. at 457-58. The facts of InternationalControls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d
166 (2d Cir. 1979), present another example of the physical challenges posed to process servers
in delivering notice of legal proceedings to a defendant. There, the process server encountered
a bolted gate and two bodyguards in front of the defendant's home, and the defendant refused
to emerge from the house so that he could be served. Id.at 177. Accordingly, the process server
attached the papers to a blue ribbon and hurled them over the defendant's fence onto the front
lawn. Id. The papers were also mailed to the defendant at his residence. Id. at 182. Finding that
the defendant had actual notice of the proceedings against him, the Second Circuit in Vesco
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B. Mail Service

The United States Supreme Court has deemed service of process by
certified57 or registered58 mail to be constitutionally sufficient in providing
notice to a defendant,59 and it is widely permitted under both federal rules and
state statutes.6" Generally, however, in effecting certified or registered mail, a
mail carrier must obtain a manually executed signature from the defendant and
must mail the return receipt bearing that signature to the plaintiff, who must
then file the return receipt with the court.6' When a mail carrier is unable to
secure the signature of the intended recipient (whose physical location may be
difficult or impossible to ascertain), this method of service will be
unavailable.62

upheld the delivery of service therein. Id.
57. Certified mail provides the sender with a mailing receipt and a record of delivery
to the defendant. U.S. PosTAL SERVICE DOMESTIC MANUAL § 5912 (1999).
58. Registered mail provides more detailed records and procedures than certified mail
and is the most secure service that the postal system offers. Id. § S911; see also id. § 5915
(discussing return receipt); § S916 (discussing restricted delivery).
59. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983) (stating
notice by mail to party whose name and address is reasonably ascertainable and which ensures
actual notice is "a minimum constitutional precondition" in a legal proceeding); Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927) (stating service on a nonresident motorist is sufficient when
a copy of the complaint is mailed to the defendant by registered mail and is also left with
registrar).
60. In 1983 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 was amended to authorize service of
process by registered or certified mail. See FED. R. Cv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) (1992) (repealed 1993).
The purpose of this amendment was to diminish the role of federal marshals as process servers
and thus to reduce litigation costs in civil actions. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Fox & Co., 103 F.R.D.
388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary on Amendment of
FederalRule 4 (Eff.Feb. 26, 1983) With Special Statute ofLimitationsPrecautions,96 F.R.D.
88,91 (1983); see alsoNEB. REV. STAT. § 25-505.01(1)(c) (1995) (stating certified mail, return
receipt requested, and filing of proof of service with return receipt attached is required); N.C.R.
Civ.P. 4j)(1)(c) (allowing for registered or certified mail, return receipt requested); N.D.R. Civ.
P. 4(d)(2)(A) (allowing any form ofimail addressed to the defendant that requires a signed receipt
and results in delivery to that individual); OR. R. Civ. P. 7(D)(2)(d)(i) (allowing first-class mail;
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested; or express mail).
Some statutes hold mail service as the preferred method of giving notice. See, e.g.,
OHIO R. Civ. P. 4.1(1)-(2) (allowing service of process to be sent by certified or express mail
unless court or plaintiff requests personal or residential service).
61. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-505.01(1)(c) (1995) (requiring filing with court
proofof service with signed receipt attached); N.C.R.Cv.P. 40)(I)(c) (requiring mailing a copy
of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and
delivering to addressee).
62. David D. Siegel, The New (Dec. 1, 1993) Rule 4 of the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure: ChangesinSummons Service andPersonalJurisdiction(p1t. 1), 151 F.R.D. 441,451
(1994). Under federal law, however, someone other than the intended recipient may sign the
notice and acknowledgment form evidencing receipt ofthe mail service in certain circumstances.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2)(A), 4(h) (providing, in pertinent part, that the notice and request
"shall be in writing and shall be addressed directly to the defendant, if an individual, or else to
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Ordinarily, first-class mail service is recognized by the United States
'
Supreme Court as "an efficient and inexpensive means of communication"63
and in some cases also meets due process requirements, particularly when used
in concert with another method of service.' Plaintiffs often utilize first-class
mail in the notification process by mailing complaints and requests for waiver
of formal service of process to the defendant.6" Technically, this use of firstclass mail does not constitute service of process; rather, the defendant's waiver
of service does away with the requirement of formal service. 66 Federal law
rewards a defendant that agrees to waive service by increasing the time from
twenty to sixty days within which to answer the complaint.67 However, the
plaintiffmust serve a defendant that refuses to provide a waiver through one of
the alternative means of formal process available under federal or state law. 68
As a result, the benefit of first-class mail in the waiver of service procedure is
dependent on and limited by the defendant's acquiescence in waiving service
of process.
C. "Substituted" Service
"Substituted" service may satisfy constitutional due process requirements
if the chosen method for giving notice is the one most likely to reach the
defendant.69 When the defendant is a natural person, leaving the papers at the

an officer or managing or general agent (or other agent authorized by appointment or law to
receive service of process) of a [corporation or association]").
63. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950).
64. Id. at 319-20; Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444,453-55 (1982) (finding service
by posting eviction notice on defendant's apartment door accompanied by mail service is
constitutionally preferable to posted service alone); Weignerv. City ofNew York, 852 F.2d 646,
651 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding mailed notice of tax foreclosure action to owner's last known
address in addition to posting and publication was sufficient to meet due process requirements);
see also OR. R. Civ. P. 7(D)(2)(d)(i) (allowing first-class mail and registered or certified mail,
return receipt requested).
65. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (allowing for waiver of formal service). A
number of state statutes contain waiver provisions similar to that contained in the federal rules.
See, e.g., Aiz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(c); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE. § 415.30 (a)-(e) (West 1973); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-213 (West 1992); ME. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1); Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)(A)-(D);
TENN. R. Civ. P. 4.07(l).
Under the federal rules, however, waiver of service does not waive a party's
objections to venue or personal jurisdiction. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
66. Siegel, supra note 60, at 455.
67. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2). The plaintiff may impose on the defendant the costs
of formal service, and may serve the defendant pursuant to (1) the federal rules, (2) the law of
the forum state, or (3) the law of the state where service is effected. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e).
69. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14; see also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92
(1917) (stating that summons delivered to defendant's "last and usual place of abode" might be
sufficient if the most likely method to reach the defendant).
Some courts and commentators use the terms "substituted" and "constructive" service
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defendant's home is the most commonly used method of substituted service. 0
Specifically, the federal rules and many state statutes require that the summons
be left at the defendant's "dwelling house or usual place of abode" with
someone of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein.'
Unlike the physical proximity issues presented by personal service, service
at a defendant's home poses problems such as identification of the defendant's
residence when the defendant occupies more than one home. 2 Locating a
defendant's center of domestic activity73 has engaged courts in arduous
investigations of defendants' life patterns, involving microscopic judicial
examination ofpersonal matters such as the cost of renovations to a defendant's
apartment, 4 as well as whether and where a defendant and her boyfriend
engaged in the habit of sleeping together."
In National Development Co. v. Triad Holding Corp.,76 the defendant
argued that service of process on his housekeeper at his New York apartment

interchangeably to mean any form of service ofprocess other than actual personal service. See,
e.g., JACK H. FREDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.20, at 169 (1985) (using both terms to
describe state statutes). Others use the terms "substituted service" to mean physical service
within the state on someone other than the defendant, and "constructive service" to mean service
by publication, posting, mail, or personal service outside the forum state. CASAD, supra note 4,
§ 1.01[2][b], at 1-10.
The terms "substituted" and "constructive" service are used interchangeably
throughout this article to mean any form of service other than personal service on the defendant
within or outside the forum state.
70. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 69, § 3.20, at 175.
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). Some states specifically set forth the required minimum
age of a recipient of service other than the defendant or require that the recipient be a family
member of a certain age. This greater degree of statutory specificity reduces the number of
challenges to the sufficiency of service that are born of interpretative uncertainty. See, e.g.,
COLO. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1) (stating service at a defendant's home requires recipient to be eighteen
and a member of defendant's family; service to defendant's usual place ofbusiness must be left
with defendant's secretary, bookkeeper, manager, or chief clerk); FLA. R. Civ. 1.080(b) (stating
that recipient must be at least fifteen years of age and informed of contents); Mo. SuP. Cr. R.
54.13(b)(1) (requiring recipient to be over the age of fifteen and member of the defendant's
family); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2004(C)(1) (West 1993) (requiring recipient to reside
therein and be fifteen years of age or older); WASH. REV.CODE ANN. § 12.04.040 (West 1993)
(requiring recipient to be over twelve years of age).
72. National Dev. Co. v. Triad Holding Corp., 930 F.2d 253, 254 (2d Cir. 1991).
73. Sheldon v. Fettig, 893 P.2d 1136,1139-40 (Wash.Ct. App. 1995), reviewgranted,
904 P.2d 300 (1995) (defining usual place of abode as the "center of one's domestic activity
[where] service left with a family member is reasonably calculated to come to one's attention
74. NationalDev. Co., 930 F.2d at 256.
75. Sheldon v. Fettig, 919 P.2d 1209, 1217-18 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting).

76. 930 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1991).
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12

Tamayo: Are You Being Served: E-mail and (Due) Service of Process
2000]

E-MAIL AND SERVICE OF PROCESS

was improper because he usually lived in Saudi Arabia." In reviewing the
defendant's connection to the New York apartment, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit noted that the defendant personally hired and paid
contractors over $1 million in remodeling the apartment to fit his lavish
lifestyle. 7' The court specifically recounted that the $20-25 million apartment,
which "contain[ed] more than 23,000 square feet on at least two
floors,... [featured] a swimming pool, a sauna, an office and four separate
furnished 'apartments'... requir[ing] the attention of two full-time and three
' As a result of its findings, the court decided that the
part-time staff persons."79
defendant's New York apartment had "sufficient indicia of permanence" to
qualify as his usual abode."
A review of a defendant's sleeping arrangements with her romantic partner
has also been subject to scrutiny in determining where she resided for purposes
of substitute service of process." In Sheldon v. Fettig,82 the Washington
Supreme Court upheld service of process on the defendant's brother at her
parents' home in Seattle. 3 The defendant had repeatedly represented her
parents' address as the place where she couldbe contacted, although she moved
to Chicago eight months prior to the service of process." In asserting that
service was ineffective because she did not reside with her parents, the
defendant testified that she no longer had a designated bedroom at her parents'
home." Rather, the defendant disclosed that when in Seattle, she always slept
at her boyfriend's house, which was next door to her parents.8 6

77. NationalDev. Co., 930 F.2d at 256-58. Service ofprocess was effected pursuant
to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states, in pertinent part, that
service shall be made "by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual
place of abode...."
78. NationalDev. Co., 930 F.2d at 256.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 257.
81. Sheldon v. Fettig, 919 P.2d 1209, 1210 (Wash. 1996).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1214. The applicable Washington service of process statute provides that
substitute service is effective when a copy of the summons is left at the defendant's house of
usual abode "with some person ofsuitable age and discretion then resident therein." WASH. RPv.
CODE ANN. § 4.28.080(15) (West Supp. 2000).
84. Id. at 1210.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also Jaffe & Asher v. Van Brunt, 158 F.R.D. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(finding a defendant who, when in New York, stayed in an apartment in which he maintained a
privatebedroom and phone line, to be living in the apartment forpurposes ofservice ofprocess);
Cox v. Quigley, 141 F.R.D. 222,225-226 (D. Me. 1992) (noting that defendant's parent's home
was not his usual place of abode when defendant moved on board a ship after graduating from
school); Capitol Life Ins. Co. v. Rosen, 69 F.R.D. 83, 87-88 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (finding defendant
to be properly served with process at his brother's home when defendant paid rent for room
where he stayed occasionally and had kept personal effects in past years).
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In addition to the issues presented in determining where a defendant
resides, service on a "person of suitable age and discretion residing" in the
defendant's home, or on an "agent" of a corporate defendant, creates
incertitude in the identification of who is qualified to receive process on behalf
of the defendant. Cases involving doormen and receptionists exhibit checkered
judicial results in their sometimes liberal, and at other times strict, statutory
interpretation of who may accept service on behalf of a defendant.
For example, in HartfordFire Insurance Co. v. Perinovic,8 .. a district
court upheld substitute service on the doorman of a defendant's high-security,
restricted-access condominium by liberally interpreting the statute allowing
service on a resident of the defendant's home."' There, the applicable federal
rule allowed service "at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein .......0
In support of its finding that the doorman fit the resident criteria of the statute,
the court relied onprecedent liberally interpreting that requirement." The court
cited Three Crown Ltd. Partnershipv. Caxton Corp.,92 in which a New York
district court upheld service on a doorman without reference in the opinion as
to whether the doorman resided in the defendant's "dwelling house."93 The
Hartfordcourt also noted a ruling approving service on a defendant's landlady
even "without a showing that the landlady delivered the summons and
complaint to the defendant."'9
Like the Three Crown court, the Hartfordcourt did not specify whether the
doorman at issue lived on the apartment building premises. 95 Further, the
Harfordcourt considered the doorman's representation to the process server
that his duties as doorman included delivering packages and documents to the
building residents, and he would accept the papers on the defendant's behalf.96
The court found the doorman's representation sufficient to support a finding

87. FED. R. Civ P. 4(e)(2) and 4(h).
88. 152 F.R.D. 128 (N.D. I11.
1993).
89. Id. at 131.
90. Id. at 130.
91. Id. at 131. Current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2) states in pertinent part
that service "may be effeted ... by leaving copies.., at the individual's dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein....
92. 817 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
93. Hartford, 152 F.R.D. at 131 (citing Three Crown Ltd. Partnership v. Caxton
Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1033, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
94. Id. (citing Smith v. Kincaid, 249 F.2d 243, 244-45 (6th Cir. 1957)).
95. Harford,152 F.R.D. at 129-30. Butsee Reliance Audio Visual Corp. v. Bronson,
534 N.Y.S.2d 313,315 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (holding service on a doorman at the building where
the defendant lived on sixteenth floor was insufficient because the dwelling place of defendant
is limited to the confines of the defendant's apartment, not extending to "stairways, public halls
or other common areas in the building").
96. Hartford, 152 F.R.D. at 131.
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that the doorman satisfied the residency requirement of the statute.97 Opinions
like Hartfordexpose the dichotomy between courts' broad interpretations of
service of process statutes and the plain language of the statutes, fueling the
uncertainty inherent in substituted service."
Service on organizational entities may be accomplished by delivering
process to an authorized corporate officer or agent of the defendant. 99 This
requirement sometimes requires process servers to conduct substantial
interrogation to determine whether the person to be served fits the statutory
silhouette of a corporate agent for purposes of service of process. 00 In Stull v.
Hoke0 ' an Oregon appeals court found that the process server did not extract
sufficient information from the receptionist of a defendant law firm to establish
her ability to accept service ofprocess on behalf of the law firm. 2 There, the
process server inquired of the receptionist whether she was at the proper law
firm. 3 After the receptionist assured the process server that she was in the
right place, the process server gave the summons to the receptionist.'0
The Stull court's finding of defective service rested on the process server's
failure to deeply question the receptionist about her job description. The
court noted, for example, that the process server did not question the
receptionist as to whether she was specifically designated to receive service of
process or important correspondence for the law firm; she did not ask her about
the extent of her duties."e Furthermore, the process server did not ask any

97. Id.
98. See generally Churchill v. Barach, 863 F. Supp. 1266, 1271 (D. Nev. 1994)
(holding service on a doorman who regularly accepted packages and messages for the residents
complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4's requirements).
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h): "[S]ervice upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon
a partnership or other unincorporated association.. . shall be effected ...
by delivering a copy
of the summons and ofthe complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one
authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the
defendant ......
100. This issue may arise in situations when service is not made on a person
specifically designated pursuant to state statute, but rather when service is effected on someone
with implied authority to receive such service.
101. 957 P.2d 173 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
102. Id. at 178-79. The applicable Oregon statute provides that service of process on
general partnerships may be made "by personal service upon a partner or any agent authorized
by appointment or law to receive service of summons for the partnership." OR. R. Civ. P.
7D(3)(e).
Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure 7D(2)(c) requires that the plaintiff also deliver by
first-class mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant.
103. Stull, 957 P.2d at 178.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 179.
106. Id. Testimony of the parties established that the process server saw the
receptionist standing by the receptionist's desk, and the receptionist asked the process server if
she needed help. The process server asked the receptionistwhether the law firm was "Brownstein
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questions about the frequency and nature of the receptionist's contact with the
partners of the fiMn.° 7 Finally, the court pointed out that the process server did
not extract a promise that she would deliver the papers to any of the law firm
partners. 08
Unlike the Harfordruling, the Stull court's strict interpretation of the
applicable statutory language resulted in its finding the service inadequate, in
spite of the reasonable expectation that the receptionist would indeed deliver
the papers to a firm partner.'" The Hartford and Stull cases expose the
difficulty in serving defendants that live and work in locales that render contact
with a defendant impossible, or at a minimum, time-consuming and costly."'
D. Postingand Publication
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that service of process
through posting or publication often provides less certainty that notice will
reach the defendant than other methods ofnotification."' As such, posting and

Rask," was informed that it was, then handed the papers to the receptionist, stating "I have
something for you." The process server then obtained the receptionist's name, which she wrote
in her records. Id. at 178.
107. Id. at 179.
108. Id.; see also Zen Music, Inc. v. CVS Corp., 1998 WL 912102, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 1998) (finding service on fianchise store manager was insufficient). But see Hoeck v.
Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, 945 P.2d 534, 542 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding service on
an attorney shareholder in law firm although process server did not know the frequency or
regularity of the attorney's contacts with the firm's managing agents).
109. Although the Stull opinion did not address whether, in spite of the alleged
procedural insufficiency ofprocess, the defendants actually received notice, courts vary in their
requirements ofstatutorycompliancewhen a defendant receives actual notice ofthe proceedings.
Some states have found service insufficient where the defendant was not served at a designated
time or place, even though the defendant received actual notice. See Schorsch v. Fireside
Chrysler-Plymouth, Mazda, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (holding service
invalid when effected by private detective in county that was not authorized by statute);
Eisenberg v. Citation-Langley Corp., 471 N.Y.S. 2d 595, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (finding
service made in contravention of statutory provision prohibiting service on Sunday void).
Conversely, other states have upheld service in cases where, despite a deficient form of service,
the defendant received actual notice. See American Hosp. of Miami, Inc., v. Nateman, 498 So.
2d 444,445 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1986) (holding defect in summons commanding sheriff to serve
summons and complaint on hospital's resident agent rather than on hospital held not sufficient
to invalidate otherwise proper service); Schodack Concerned Citizens v. Town Bd. of Schodack,
544 N.Y.S. 2d 49,50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (upholding service made by a party to proceedings
in contravention of statute);
110. The court in Hartfordnoted that during a six-day period, at least seven attempts
were made to serve the defendant. During one attempt at service, the process server waited at the
defendant's building for over five hours in an unsuccessful attempt to serve the defendant as he
exited his apartment building. Hartford,152 F.R.D. at 129 n.5.
111. In Mullane v. CentralHanoverBank& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950), the
Supreme Court stated:
Publication may theoretically be available for all the
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publication have been deemed constitutionally sufficient only in certain
circumstances when the defendant cannot be served personally." 2 In Greene
v. Lindsey,"3 for example, the Court struck down as unconstitutional the
posting of an eviction notice on an apartment door in a public housing
project." 4 There, the Court found that the notice was not reasonably calculated
to reach the occupants, because such notices were often removed
5 by children
notice."
the
receive
could
defendant
the
before
tenants
or other
Service by publication, like posting, is usually permitted only when
personal service cannot be effected with due diligence and is more likely to be
upheld if it is supplemented by another method of service." 6 One example is
Mennonite Board ofMissions v. Adams," 7 where the United States Supreme

world to see, but it is too much in our day to suppose
that each or any individual beneficiary does or could
examine all that is published to see if something may
be tucked away in it that affects his property interests.
112. See, e.g., id. at 317 (finding that service by publication is sufficient when it is
the only method ofnotice available to plaintiff); see also Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 45253 (1982) (stating that posting may be allowed in some instances when personal service is not
possible).
113. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
114. Id. at 453, 455.
115. Id. at453 &n.7.
116. In limited circumstances, some states allow service by publication. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.011 to -041 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) (allowing service by publication
after diligent search and inquiry to discover name and residence of the defendant, and the
plaintiff supplies sworn statement declaring defendant's age, or that the age is unknown;
furthermore, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's residence is unknown or she is in a state
or country other than Florida, or that the defendant has been absent from Florida for sixty days
or is concealing herself, and that there is no person in Florida on whom service of process is
binding; all ofthese findings mustbe set forth in a sworn statement by the plaintiff); IDAHO CODE
§ 5-508 (1998) (allowing such evidence when "with due diligence" the defendant cannot be
found); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2 206 (West 1992) (allowing such service when plaintiff
shows by affidavit that the defendant resides or has gone out ofstate and after due inquiry cannot
be found or is concealed, or on diligent inquiry the defendant's residence is unknown); R.I.
SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 4(i) (allowing service by publication when service cannot be made by
another prescribed method).
Several states require affidavits from the plaintiff and a court order before service of
process by publication may ensue. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4(e)(1)(A) (1993); MD. R. Civ. P.
§ 2-122; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-517.02 (1995); NEV. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1)(i). In order to increase the
likelihood of receipt of notice by publication, some statutory provisions also require that the
papers be mailed to the defendant. See ALA. CODE § 6-6-563 (West 1993); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 4.2(t) (West Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 799.12(4) (West Supp. 1999).
117. 462 U.S. 791 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in Sallie v. Tax Sale
Investors, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 612, 617 & n.2 (D. Md. 1998); see also Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1962) (holding publication of condemnation notice in two New
York City newspapers and two county newspapers in small communities many miles from the
plaintiff's property, and posting of notices on trees and poles in general vicinity of vacant
property, did not constitute adequate notice when the plaintiff's name and address were readily
ascertainable); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) (holding newspaper
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Court found that publication alone was not reasonably calculated to apprise a
mortgagee of an impending tax sale, particularly when the mortgagee's address
could be easily identified in the public records."' There, the Court ruled that
notice by publication must be accompanied by personal service or notice
mailed to the mortgagee's last known address." 9 As a result of their limited
effectiveness, posting and publication are generally restricted to use in certain
types of cases or when personal service is not feasible. 2 '
The foregoing examples of judicial interpretation of due process and
statutory requirements expose the uncertainty involved in determining what
constitutes effective notice under existing mechanisms for service of process.
Consequently, the feasibility of notice delivered electronically is ripe for
consideration.
IV. THE BRITISH CASE

"The Plaintiffdohave leave to serve notice ofthe Writ herein,
and to serve the Affidavit and this Order ... by E-Mail, at
the number and addressesstated on the Writ herein."'2 '
Recently, the use of electronic mail for service figured into the litigation
context when a British court allowed service of process of an injunction at a
defendant's electronic mail address." The British case involved initial service
ofprocess of an order of injunction." z Although injunctive relief in the United

publication ofcondemnation notice ofproceedings against Kansas property not sufficient when
name of owner, a Kansas resident, was ascertainable from official records).
118. Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800.

119. Id. at 798.
120. Posting notice on premises is authorized in some states for specific actions. For
example, posting is often used to serve process in actions to quiet title to, or for possession of,
real property. See Friedman v. Hofchar, Inc., 424 So. 2d 496, 497-98 (La. Ct. App. 1982);
Miebach v. Colasurdo, 670 P.2d 276, 278, 282 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983); see also CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN § 52-68 (West 1991) (allowing such notice in "writs of error and appeals from

probate"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-336(6) (1981) (allowing such service in "actions for the
establishment of title to real estate by possession"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-307(3) (1994)

(allowing such service "[i]n actions which relate to or the subject of which is real or personal
property in this state"). Similarly, publication is allowed in some states only upon a showing that
the plaintiff has been unsuccessful in personally serving the defendant. See Olivetti Corp. of
America v. Silia Property, Inc., 467 A.2d 321,321 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983); Ingle v. Whitlock, 282
S.C. 391,392-93,318 S.E.2d 367,368 (1984); cf.Bankers TrustN.Y. Corp. v. Greenberger, 466
N.Y.S.2d 921,921 (1983) (denying publication whenbusiness address ofdefendantwas known).
121. Order issued by the Queens Bench Division of the Royal Courts of Justice,

London, England on April 11, 1996, in sealed proceedings. The order was obtained by the law
firm of Schilling & Loin in London. Paul Lambeth & Jonathan Coad, Serving the Internet:
Nowhere to Hide in Cyberspace, CYBERSPACE LAW., Sept. 1996, at 6-7.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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States is governed by federal and state statutes separate from those setting forth
notice requirements in actions seeking money damages, the notice requirements
in those actions are similar in that they both require notice providing the
defendant with an opportunity to present a defense. 4
The British case involved a "media personality" plaintiff about whom the
defendant had threatened to disseminate defamatory material over the
Internet.' s The defendant had delivered a series of e-mail messages to the
plaintiff's attorney's office, and had promised to post the information on the
Internet within a short period of time. 26 The plaintiff's attorney immediately
applied to the Royal Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division in London, for
an injunction. 127 The attorney, however, could not physically serve the
defendant through the usual means of service of process because the plaintiff
The only
only knew that the defendant was somewhere in Europe.'
indications of the defendant's location were postmarks on the envelopes of
various letters that he had sent to the plaintiff, and the defendant's fax line,
which was in a country different than that from which the letters had been
sent. 129 However, the defendant had previously provided the plaintiff's lawyer
with two e-mail addresses through which he allegedly could be reached. 3
Having only one method of notifying the defendant of the injunction, the
plaintiff's attorney petitioned the court for permission to serve the defendant
at his e-mail address.' The judge granted the request for substituted service
under English Rule 4 of the Supreme Court, and the defendant was served

124. The federal rules prohibit issuance of a preliminary injunction without notice to
the opposing party. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 states in pertinent part: "(a) Preliminary
Injunction. (1) Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse
party." See also Western Water Management, Inc. v. Brown, 40 F.3d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1994)
(prohibiting modification of injunction in absence of notice); Parker v. Ryan, 960 F.2d 543,544
n.1 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that notice of injunctive proceedings should provide opponent with
at least a fair opportunity to prepare opposition);
125. Lambeth & Coad, supranote 121, at 6.
126. Id.
127. Id. The proceedings consisted of an "emergency application" to a "Judge in
Chambers" conducting closed, nonpublic proceedings. Information is not available as to whether
the defendant had been provided notice and an opportunity for hearing during the proceedings
for a temporary restraining order prior to the plaintiff's request for an injunction. Id.
128. Id. The Rules of the Supreme Court of England require personal service of an
injunction. R.S.C. Order 65, Rules 1-2. An important aspect of the plaintiff's argument for
electronic notice was that "[t]he normal means of service provided no means of putting the
Defendant on immediate notice of the injunction to ensure that he was bound by it and liable for
contempt of court if he breached it." Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The plaintiff's attorneys did not make clear whether the e-mail addresses
utilized to provide the defendant with notice of the action were those used by the defendant in
sending the threatening e-mails, or whether the defendant provided the attorneys with other eaddresses where he could be contacted.
131. Id.
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electronically with the injunction by the plaintiffs attorney e-mailing a copy
of the injunction to the defendant's e-mail address.' 32 Subsequently, the
defendant responded to the e-mail message incorporating the injunction by
sending an e-mail to the plaintiff's attorney. 33 Thus, it was established that the
defendant had notice of the injunction.
This British case serves as an example of electronic service of process
being effected quickly, efficiently, and inexpensively. Its success in giving
notice to the defendant of the action against him raises the question of whether
service of process by e-mail is a viable method of service for plaintiffs
litigating in United States courts. Underlying this query are the preliminary
considerations of whether due process requirements for notice, and presently
available electronic technology, will permit adequate notice to a defendant
through electronic mail.
V. ELECrRONIC TECHNOLOGY AND THE LITIGATION PROCESS

Electronic mail has become a powerful communication tool in the general
population, and its use is growing steadily in the legal profession.'34 Electronic
case filing, for example, has be~n utilized since 1991, when Delaware state
courts began electronically tracking asbestos-related litigation.'35 Since then,
a plethora of state and federal courts have begun experimenting with e-filing
programs. In 1997 the Administrative Office ofthe U.S. Courts began utilizing
electronic filing in four federal district courts and in five bankruptcy courts.'36

132. Lambeth & Coad,supranote 121, at 6. The English Rules of the Supreme Court
provide that an order for "substituted service should be granted only where the Court 'is satisfied
that a practical impossibility of actual service exists, and that the method of substituted service
asked for by the Plaintiff is one which in all reasonable probability, if not certainty, will be
effective to bring knowledge of the Writ or notice of the Writ (as the case may be) to the
Defendant."' Id. at 7 (quoting R.S.C. Order 65, Rule 4).
The plaintiff electronically served the defendant with a writ, an affidavit, and an order
that stated, in part:
(1) The Plaintiff do have leave to serve the Writ
herein outside the jurisdiction of this Honourable
Court;
(2) The Plaintiff do have leave to serve notice of the
Writ herein, and to serve the Affidavit and this
Order... by E-Mail, at the number and addresses
stated on the Writ herein.
Id. at 6. The plaintiffs attorneys did not disclose the contents of the writ and affidavit.
133. Id. The defendant's confirmation of receipt of the e-mail obviated the court's
consideration of whether the absence of such confirmation precludes a finding of actual notice.
134. In 1998, 3.4 trillion e-mail messages were delivered. Scott Laird, Web Wise
Sending Out EmailMarketingPeopleBotherto Read,INTERAcrv PRAND MARKETING NEWS,
Feb. 5, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5959962.
135. Mark Hansen, Courts Saving Time and Trees, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1999, at 20.
136. Id.
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By the end of 1999, eight additional courts were expected to have joined the efiling project, and every federal court may be authorized to use e-filing by the
close of the year 2000.'7 In fact, some federal judges have suggested that efiling should be mandatory, and some state courts are making similar moves
with great rapidity. 3
E-mail has also begun to be admitted as evidence in both civil litigation
and criminal cases. In Straussv. MicrosoftCorp.,'39 the plaintiffsued Microsoft
Corporation alleging sexual discrimination inthe workplace."4 There, a federal
district court inNew York found that sexually oriented e-mail messages, which
plaintiff's supervisor circulated among employees of Microsoft, would be
admissible into evidence to help establish evidence of sexual discrimination by
Microsoft. 4' The court in Straussreasoned that under Rule 401 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the e-mails were relevant and thus admissible because they
could render the veracity ofMicrosoft's proffered reason for failing to promote
the plaintiff "less probable" than it would be without the electronic evidence. 42
In United States v. Ferber43 a Massachusetts federal district court admitted an
e-mail message into evidence during the criminal trial of a financial advisor
accused of numerous violations of fiduciary duties to his clients.'" There, the
court found that the e-mail, prepared by a party shortly after his conversation
with the defendant, qualified as an admissible "present sense impression" under

137. Id.
138. Id. Indeed, e-filing is mandatory in the 58th Civil District Court of Jefferson
County, Texas, for civil cases with ten or more parties, and cases in which all the parties
subscribe to the LAWPIus system. Melinda M. Hanson, State Courts Go Separate Ways in
Implementing E-FilingInitiatives, 67 U.S.L.W. 2563,2565 (1999).
Several other jurisdictions use or have used e-filing for civil cases. Id. at 2564. Pima
County, Arizona accepts pleadings and filing fees over the Internet for small-claims cases. The
Third Judicial District Court in Shawnee County, Kansas, has allowed e-filing for collections
cases since January 1998, and now estimates that a paperless filing saves nine hours compared
to traditional methods. Id. at 2565.
Other jurisdictions that have initiated e-filing programs include Snake River Basin
Adjudication District Court (Idaho), Washtenaw County Court (Michigan), 18th Judicial District
(Colorado), Superior Court (Delaware), Los Angeles and Orange County Superior Courts
(Caifomia.), and Prince George's County District Court (Maryland.). Id.
139. No. 91 Cdv. 5928 (SWK), 1995 WL 326492, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995).
140. Id.
141. Id.at *4.The opinion does not specify whetherhard-copy versions ofthe subject
e-mail messages would be admitted into evidence.
142. Id.Rule 401 states: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
143. 966 F. Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997). The e-mail message was admitted into
evidence in the form of a hard-copy printout.
144. Id. at 98.
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the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 45 These decisions exemplify the judiciary's
acknowledgment that electronic documents, in certain circumstances, may
carry the legal recognition historically reserved for more traditional evidence
created by typewriters, word processors, or manually written documents.
Service of process in the United States by electronic means is a recent
development that has been allowed only in narrow circumstances. In 1980 a
New York federal district court broke new ground by allowing service of
process through: (1) delivery of a telex message written in the Farsi and
English languages and sent to each Iranian defendant, and (2) mailing of a copy
of the pleadings to the individual defendants."4 At the time the lawsuit was
filed inNew EnglandMerchantsNationalBankv. Iran PowerGenerationand
TransmissionCo., 47 the Iran crisis had caused a disruption of the established
relationship between the respective governments of the United States and Iran,
and had also caused a breakdown of the Iranian postal service, rendering
service by traditional methods impossible.4 4 The court explained its view of
modem communication methods as follows:
Courts .

.

. cannot be blind to changes and advances in

technology. No longer do we live in a world where
communications are conducted solely by mail carried by fast
sailing clipper or steam ships. Electronic communication via
satellite can and does provide instantaneous transmission of
notice and information. No longer must process be mailed to
a defendant's door when he can receive complete notice at an
electronic terminal inside
his very office, even when the door
14 9
is steel and bolted shut.
145. Id. at 99. Rule 803 provides: "The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (1) Present sense impression. -A
statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
146. NewEngland Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission
Co., 495 F. Supp. 73,81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court directed the plaintiffs to include in the telex
message the following information: (1) the text ofthe summons; (2) a notice of suit as provided
by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) (1994); and, (3) a notice that
a copy of the pleadings would be mailed under separate cover. Id.
147. 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
148. See id. at 75. In New England Merchants NationalBank, various U.S. banks
brought actions in a New York district court against Iran, Iranian agencies, and private Iranian
corporate entities. The plaintiffs sought damages for the defendants' repudiation of executory
contracts and the nationalization of the plaintiffs' private property in Iran. Subsequently, the
defendants' assets were frozen by Presidential order, and the plaintiffs were granted orders of
attachment over those assets. Although the defendants had actual notice of the attachment
proceedings, the plaintiffs were required under Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to give the defendants formal notice within sixty days of the granting of the attachment order.
Id. at 77.
149. Id. at 81.
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Eight years later, in Calabresev. SpringerPersonnel of New York, Inc.,'" a
New York state trial court allowed a plaintiff's attorney to fax to the
defendant's attorney an order rendered by that court.'5 ' There, the plaintiff's
attorney faxed to the defendant's attorney a court order requiring the defendant
to respond to the plaintiffs interrogatories within twenty days of service of the
order.'52 Eight days after the twenty-day period expired, the defendant's
attorney mailed to the plaintiff's attorney the responses to the interrogatories. 53
The plaintiff rejected the interrogatory responses as untimely, and the parties
then addressed the validity of service of process by fax in a subsequent
hearing. 54 In support of its finding that delivery of notice by fax was a
reasonable method of service, the court in Calabresestated:
[T]here could now ensue controversy as to whether the
recipient's office is open, whether anyone is in charge, and
whether the fax machine is in a conspicuous place. I refuse,
however, to engage in such Augustinian folly. Of course the
office is open when the fax machine is receiving. If an
operator is present, of course there is delivery. If no operator
is present, of course the fax machine, which is visited
regularly, is in a conspicuous place. 5
The court's ruling in Calabrese constitutes the first published opinion
considering the use of fax machines in litigation." 6
In 1996 a federal district court in Massachusetts for the first time upheld
notice delivered by e-mail and through the Internet to potential plaintiffs in a
class action. In Greebelv. FTP Software Inc., 57 notice of a class action was
sent via the Internet to print publications and to wire services for circulation. 58

150. 534 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988).
151. Id. at 84.
152. Id. In June of 1988, Judge Lane issued an order striking the defendant's answer
to the complaint unless the defendant responded to the plaintiff's interrogatories within twenty
days of service of the order. Id. at 83-84.
153. Id. at 84.
154. Id.
155. Id. In spite of the court's finding that the twenty-day responsive period began
when the order was properly served by fax, it nonetheless utilized its discretionary power to
admit the defendant's interrogatory responses.
156. Id. at 83. See generallyMurphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing Inc., 526 U.S.
344 (1999) (holding that the defendant's receipt of a complaint faxed by the plaintiff did not
trigger thirty-day removal period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1994), because fax transmission
is notformal service); Hendricks County Bank &Trust Co. v. Guthrie Bldg. Materials, Inc., 663
N.E.2d 1180, 1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that a fax transmission did not constitute
service of notice of adverse claim by a nonjudgment creditor, because fax transmission cannot
provide proof that notice was actually delivered to a person authorized to accept service).
157. 939 F. Supp. 57 (D.Mass. 1996).
158. Id. at 59, 62-63.
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There, the federal statutory publication provision required that "the
plaintiff... shall cause to be published... in a widely circulated national
business-oriented publication orwire service, anotice advising members ofthe
purported plaintiff class ....5

The lead Greebel plaintiff supplied the press release to "Business Wire,"
a service which electronically disseminates news releases to news media, online services and databases, and the Internet."6 The district court in Greebel
found that because publication on Business Wire was reasonably calculated to
reach an adequate number of potential plaintiffs who were sophisticated and
institutional investors, the electronic delivery and circulation of the press
release satisfied the federal statute's requirement of publication. 6'
Resisting the modem approaches to electronic notice employed by the
courts in the British case 62 and in New England Merchants NationalBank,
Calabrese,and Greebel, on March 8, 1999, a federal district court in California
held that service of process by e-mail to a defendant's electronic address, when
the plaintiff did not know the actual identity of the defendant, was improper.'63
In Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com,'" the plaintiff insurance
company owned the federally registered trademarks "SEE'S" and "SEE'S
CANDIES.' 165 The defendants registered the Internet domain names
"seescandy.com" and "seecandys.com," and subsequently sent the plaintiff
thirty-one e-mails informing the plaintiff that confused customers had
attempted to order candy from their web sites.'" The defendants indicated in
the e-mails that they would be willing to sell the two domain names to the
67
plaintiff.1
On February 22, 1999, the plaintiff filed an action in federal court seeking
injunctive relief and money damages for trademark infringement and unfair
trade practices occasioned by the defendants' registration of domain names
similar to those owned by the plaintiff.'68 The plaintiff, however, did not know
the actual identities of the defendants and could identify them only by their

159. Id. at 62 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 11995)).
160. Greebel, 939 F. Supp. at 62-63.
161. Id. at 63-64.
162. See supranotes 121-133 and accompanying text.
163. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
164. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
165. Id. at 576. The plaintiff Columbia Insurance Company was an assignee of the
trademarks "SEE'S," "SEE'S CANDIES," and "FAMOUS OLD TIME" from See's Candy
Shops, Inc. Id. at 575-76.
166. Id. at 575, 580. The defendants registered the subject domain names with
Network Solutions, Inc., a database containing domain names that have been reserved by
individuals or firms for use on the Internet. Id. at 575-76.
167. Id. at 579.
168. Id. at 575. For a good discussion of the legal issues raised by domain-name
litigation, see Vincent Chiappetta, Rules ofthe Road: Traffic Controlat the Trademark-Internet
Intersection,60 OR. ST. B. BULL. 21 (1999).
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Interet pseudonyms, which were aliases that had been listed by the defendants
in registering the domain names at issue.'69
In an effort to serve the defendants with the motion for temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction, and the complaint, the plaintiff sent
those documents by e-mail to the electronic addresses that had been provided
by the defendants to the domain-name registration service. The plaintiff
received no response from the addressees. 7 ' In ColumbiaInsurance Co. the
court briefly explained that notice by electronic delivery did not comply with
the federal rules because the plaintiff must ascertain the defendant's name and
in compliance
address to serve the defendant with the summons and1 complaint
71
with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Unlike the Columbia Insurance Co. opinion, the courts' endorsement of
electronic transmissions of notice in the British case and in New England
Merchants National Bank, Calabrese, and Greebel embody a judicial
recognition that in some instances, electronic delivery is indeed a reasonable
method of serving certain forms of notice on interested parties. To date,
however, no United States court has found that e-mail may serve as an
initial notice of litigation to an individual
adequate method of delivering
17
1
entity.
business
or
defendant

169. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 577.
170. Id. at 575-76.
171. Id. at 577. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2) states, in pertinent part, that
"service upon an individual ... may be effected... by delivering a copy of the summons and
of the complaint to the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process."
The district court also denied the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, stating that
even if it granted the temporary restraining order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)
without serving the defendant with process, once that order expired, under the federal rules the
plaintiff could not obtain a preliminary injunction without prior notice to the defendant. Id. at
576-77.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) states, in pertinent part: "A temporary
restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party or to that
party's attorney only if(1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the
verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the
applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the
applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to
give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be required."
172. Soon, however, e-mail may provide an acceptable method of service of process
on pleadings filed subsequent to the original complaint in federal court. In April 1999 the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee recommended amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b).
The amendment would allow electronic service of every pleading subsequent to the original
complaint, so long as the prospective recipient agrees to be served by subsequent pleadings
electronically. The Advisory Committee further recommended that if local court rules allow it,
and consent is given by the parties, a party may file a document with the court and use the
court's transmission facilities to serve all parties. ADvisoRY COMMITrEE ON CIVILRULES, REPORT
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VI. INITIAL SERVICE OF PROCESS THROUGH E-MAL
E-mail presents an option that is potentially superior to mechanisms for
service of process presently available. E-mail's advantage is in its ability to
hasten communication ofnotice by circumventing physical restrictions inherent
in the traditional methods of its delivery. Whether e-mail is a viable option
for serving process, however, depends on two factors. The first rests on its
ability to meet constitutional due process requirements for the delivery of
adequate notice. The second depends on whether present-day electronic
technology is sufficiently sophisticated to provide the sender with a reliable
confirmation of receipt by the served party.
Due process requires that a reasonable effort be made to ensure that a
defendant receives notice of a pending legal action through personal service,
or by an alternate method most likely to reach the defendant.' Successful
service through e-mail thus presupposes a reasonable expectation that the
defendant may be found at his or her e-mail address, and must provide
reasonable confirmation that the defendant received the notice.'76
One scenario allowing a plaintiff to easily deliver notice to a defendant at
a particular electronic address involves a corporate defendant that is statutorily

required to accept service through a designated registered agent that has
specified an e-mail address for receipt of service.' Another illustration is in

COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (last modified Aug. 31, 1999)
<http://www.uscourts.gov/rules2/proprules.pdf> at 38-39, 40-47.
173. See supranote 3 describing the process of transmitting a message via e-mail.
174. See Rowley v. Cleaver, 598 N.W.2d 125, 126-27 (N.D. 1999) and Hanson v.
Venditelli, 712N.E.2d 1212,1213 (Mass. App. CL 1999) forstate rule requirements thatplaintiff
confirm service of the summons and complaint by filing with the court proof of service by
affidavit and return receipt, or by written attestation of serving officer.
175. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
176. Although the Court in Mullaneset forth a requirement of reasonable notice, the
opinion acknowledged that in certain circumstances, the unlikelihood that a defendant will
receive actual notice does not render the service unconstitutional. "Undeniably, there are
situations in which insistence on actual notice, or even on the high probability of actual notice,
would be both unfair to plaintiffs and harmful to the public interest." Dobkin v. Chapman, 236
N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1968) (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317, 319); see also Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1956) (stating that the type ofnotice required will vary with
circumstances and conditions, and in some cases it might not be reasonably possible to give
personal notice, for example, when people are missing or unknown). Defendants whose
whereabouts are known, however, may seek reversal of a defaultjudgment entered against them
upon proof that they did not receive actual notice of the proceedings against them. Roper v.
Dailey, 393 So. 2d 85, 88 (La. 1981).
177. In most states, service on a corporation may be accomplished by delivering a
copy of the summons and complaint to the registered agent of said corporation named on the
records of the secretary of state. See, e.g., MONT. R. Cv. P. 4D(2)(e)(ii). Statutory provisions
such as this could easily be amended to accommodate electronic service ofprocess by requiring
that the registered agent provide the secretary of state with an e-mail address for service of
process.
OF THE ADVISORY
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the delivery of an electronic summons and complaint pursuant to a waiver of
service provision, in which a response from the defendant agreeing to waive
service conclusively establishes receipt of notice.' E-mail also presents a
viable method of notification in breach of contract actions if the parties have
incorporated into the contract a provision for electronic service ofprocess and
an e-mail address for such purpose.' 79 Lastly, the British case exemplifies
successful delivery of electronic notice, because the defendant's electronic
address was the only place where he could be found, and when a subsequent
response to the plaintiff's e-mail confirmed receipt of service of process.8 0
As individuals and businesses increase their use of electronic
communications, statutory andjudicial movement toward legal recognition that
a defendant may be found at his or her e-mail address for purposes of service
of process may be reasonably expected.' Currently, the appearance of e-mail
addresses on business cards is nearly ubiquitous. 82 Similarly, in an effort to
facilitate and enhance customer contact, business advertising very frequently
includes the web page and e-mail address of the advertiser. Individuals' use of
e-mail for personal communication renders it increasingly reasonable to attach
legal reliance that a person may be successfully contacted through her
electronic address. Indeed, courts' findings that a defendant has established an
a forum sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction are
electronic presence in
83
now commonplace.

178. See, for example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(4), which provides a
waiver of service provision that obviates the need for formal service upon the defendant's
response to plaintiffs request that the defendant waive service.
179. When a defendant contractually consents to the jurisdiction of a court, service
of process that is imperfect under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but that meets due
process requirements, will be upheld. Lawnv. Franklin, 328 F. Supp. 791,794 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
see also AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Hagenbarth, 296 F. Supp. 1142, 1143 (E.D.
Pa. 1968) (holding service valid that was contractually consented to although imperfect under
federal rules).
180. See supra Part IV.
181. One study predicts that by the year 2000, 108 million people will utilize e-mail.
Gary Burnett, IT World: ElectronicMail: The Fax ofLife, Belfast Newsletter, July 7, 1998,
availablein 1998 WL 27606988. This estimate represents twice the number of e-mail users in
1998. Id. Another trend that will enhance the connection between an individual and her e-mail
address is the use of "kneetop" personal computers, which may be easily carried and stored. The
PCs, which are less than an inch thick, weigh less than three pounds, and contain batteries that
will remain charged for eight to twelve hours, are likely to become ubiquitous accompaniments
for many individuals. Joshua Quittner, New Kneetop PCs, TImE, Mar. 1, 1999, at 83.
182. Wayne Walley, Communications Transition: Data'sDayHasAlreadyArrived,
Global Telephony, Dec. 30, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 10350957.
183. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that an Illinois resident who registered the"Panavision" trademark on the Internet
as his domain name was subject to personal jurisdiction in California under the "effects test,"
because he engaged in extortion from the California company, the injury would be felt in
California, and the plaintiffs claim arose out of defendant's conduct); CompuServe, Inc. v.
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that actively using the Internet to
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Assuming that the plaintiff knows the defendant's e-mail address, various
concerns arise regarding its use for serving process. One consideration in
deciding whether e-mail notice complies with due process requirements

contract and solicit business subjected the defendant to personal jurisdiction in the customer's
state); Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 701-02 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that court
had personal jurisdiction over a defendant that solicited business through an Internet site
accessible by Virginia residents); GTENew Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech. Corp., 21 F. Supp.
2d. 27,38-39 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that defendant's highly interactive and commercial "yellow
pages" website from which defendant derived revenue provided sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state); Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats, Inc., No. 97-C8745,1998 WL 246152, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1998) (holding that defendant's website expressly soliciting forum state
residents' business established contact with forum state for specific jurisdiction); Thompson v.
Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738,744 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that California corporation
with website had sufficient contacts with Texas to establish jurisdiction when it entered into
contracts with Texas citizens over the Internet); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960
F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that court had personal jurisdiction over the
defendant when the defendant advertised its business through its website, sold goods to forum
state residents, and entered into contract governed by law of forum state); Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a company
satisfied minimum contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction when it offered a news service
over the Internet, had more than three thousand paying customers in the forum state, and entered
into contracts with multiple Internet service providers in that state); Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that an interactive website providing
users with information and ability to join mailing list established minimum contacts with the
forum); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding
thatthe courthadpersonaljurisdiction over defendant company which solicited business through
toll-free number listed on website). But see Mink v. AAAA Dev., Inc., 190 F.3d 333, 337 (5th
Cir. 1999) (holding that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over a Vermont company
that advertised in the forum state through the Internet, but did not accept customers' orders
through its website); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a Florida corporation was not subject to personal jurisdiction when the defendant
posted a "passive" web page and conducted no commercial activity over the Internet);
Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Med. Surgical Prods. Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d. 448, 451-52
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that generaljurisdiction over defendant does not exist when defendant's
Internet contacts not found to be purposefully directed at forum); Hurley v. Cancun Playa Oasis
Int'l Hotels, No. CIv.A.99-574, 1999 WL 718556, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1999) (holding that
the court does not have personal jurisdiction when the defendant did not make deliberative
contact through its website with the forum state); Fix My PC, L.L.C. v. N.F.N. Assocs., 48 F.
Supp. 2d. 640, 643-44 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that the defendants' "passive" website
accessible in the forum state, toll-free number displayed on the website, and unrelated business
transactions in the forum state did not establish minimum contacts sufficient for personal
jurisdiction in the forum state); Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp.
2d. 907, 910 (D. Or. 1999) (holding that the defendant's maintenance of a website, purchase of
a compact disk by a customer in the forum state, and sporadic purchases from forum state
company are not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction); Shapiro v. Santa Fe Gaming Corp.,
No. 97-C- 6117, 1998 WL 102677, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1998) (holding that the court did not
have personaljurisdiction even though the defendant's website posted toll-free numbers because
the purpose of the website was to provide information, not to solicit business); Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating New York court did
not have jurisdiction over Missouri restaurant for trademark infringement when website for
restaurant was not interactive and not designed to attract New York residents).
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involves whether the plaintiff can prove that the defendant received the
electronic complaint and summons. The United States Postal Service has
developed amethod for document delivery that enhances the certainty involved
in the confirmation of receipt of electronic documents.!84 A person wishing to
send an electronic "package" through the postal service may do so through the
electronic document delivery service available on their web page. 8 ' The
service, known as "Post E.C.S.,"confirms that the transmission was successful
and electronically informs the sender as to when the message was received.'
Additionally, the service allows a sender to use a document format technology
enabling a recipient to read an e-document regardless of whether the software
application (the e-language) used to create
the document was different from
87
that on the computer of the recipient.1
In addition to the United States Post Office, private companies offer
sofhvare that allows "return receipt" confirmation of document delivery to an
electronic addressee by tracking not only when the message is delivered, but
when the recipient "opens" the e-mail.' The software carries out this function
by electronically posting to the original e-mail in the sender's mailbox a
confirmation of the date and time of the e-mail's delivery, as well as when the
addressee opened the message.8 9 A plaintiff that serves the defendant
electronically, and receives a confirmation that the defendant opened the
message, could then file with the court an affidavit along with a copy of the
electronic return receipt, thus establishing delivery of the summons and
complaint.19 The current availability of electronic services confirming a
defendant's receipt of electronic notice weighs persuasively towards
application of a presumption of trustworthiness that has been historically
granted to notice delivered only by traditional methods of service.
184. United States Postal Service, Post E.C.S.-21st-Century Document Delivery

System, 25 DELIVERING THEFUTURE (Mar. 29, 1999) <http:/www.usps.gov/dtf/25short5.htm>.
185. See United States Postal Service, PostElectronic CourierService (visited Feb
25, 2000) <http:llwww.usps.gov/postecs>.
186. See supra note 184.

187. Id.
188. Microsoft Outlook 98 provides the return receipt option. Bruce Racond, Creating
Order Out of Chaos, OFFICE SYsTEMS, Aug. 1, 1998, at 36, 40. Eudora Pro 4.0 also offers a
similar return receipt feature. Rick Broida, Making the Upgrade, HOME OFFICE COMPUTING,
Feb.1, 1998, at 58, 59.

189. Id.
190. This procedure is similar to the requirement in most jurisdictions that the
plaintiff file with the court the return receipt evidencing delivery of the legal papers to the
defendant. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-505.01(1)(c) (1995) (allowing service of summons
by certified mail with a return receipt requested and requiring filing of proof of service with
return receipt attached); N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1)(c) (allowing service of process by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested); N.D. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2)(A) (allowing service of process
by any form of mail addressed to the defendant that requires a signed receipt and results in
delivery to that individual); OR. R. Civ. P. 7(D)(2)(d)(i) (allowing service of process by firstclass mail and by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested).
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Although confirmation that the electronic notice has been successfully
delivered or opened does not establish that the recipient has actually read the
contents of the message, due process does not require confirmation that the
defendant has read the notice; due process requires only that the notice was
delivered.'' The law's presumption that papers delivered are deemed read is
illustrated in substituted service." When substituted service is properly
effected on an authorized recipient, the defendant is presumed to have received
the notice.'9 a Accordingly, a defendant's assertion that she did not read an
electronic notice that was otherwise properly delivered may be rebuffed by the
legal presumption that the defendant will read the contents of notice properly
served. In fact, e-mail provides greater assurance than some methods of service
that the defendant will be apprised of notice. Unlike documents delivered by
substituted service of process to someone other than the defendant, notice sent
to a defendant's e-address has no potential for post arrival physical movement
and will remain in the defendant's mailbox until retrieved, thereby eliminating
the risk of misplacement. 4
One writer has envisioned a future model of litigation in which, in order
to facilitate electronic service of process, corporations and government
agencies would be required to register their electronic addresses. 5 Similarly,
individuals that do not make their e-mail addresses public through the
registration process would be assessed the cost ofservice. 95 Indeed, this vision
of the legal profession's embrace of electronic communication at the very
inception of litigation would facilitate, and perhaps revolutionize, traditional

191. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
192. There is a duty to check for mail, and a letter properly sent is considered
received, even if it does not reach the hands of the addressee or is not read by the addressee.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 68 cmt. a (1981); see also Logan v. Corinth-Alcorn
County Joint Airport Bd., 665 F. Supp. 506, 511 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (holding that a letter handdelivered to recipient's secretary is deemed received); Holmes v. Myles, 37 So. 588,589 (Ala,
1904) (holding effective as an acceptance a letter left at the house of an offeror before expiration
of the option period, but not read until after expiration of the option period).
193. The return of the process server's citation is prima facie evidence of service.
Roper v. Dailey, 393 So. 2d 85, 86 (La. 1981). This presumption may be rebutted, however, by
clear and convincing evidence establishing that service of process did not result in delivery of
papers to the defendant. Id.
194. This scenario assumes that the defendant maintains a private password to ensure
sole access to her e-mailbox.
195. Paul D. Carrington, VirtualCivil Litigation: A Visit to JohnBunyan's Celestial
City, 98 COLUM. L. Rsv. 1516, 1534 (1998). Although Mr. Carrington does not specify where
the electronic addresses should be registered, the corporate or governmental entities could easily
include that information along with the statutorily required name of an agent for service of
process in their filings with the secretary of state. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
196. Carrington, supranote 195, at 1534. Such an assessment could mirror the model
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow a plaintiff to impose on the
defendant the costs of formal service when that defendant refuses to provide a waiver ofservice
of the complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2).
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methods of serving process.
VII. CONCLUSION

As methods of communication improve and individual mobility increases,
mechanisms for serving process should evolve to allow for more convenient
methods of serving process on a defendant while complying with constitutional
due process and statutory requirements. Presently, service of process on an
individual defendant can be accomplished only through methods reliant on a
physical connection with the defendant or defendant's agent. The advent of
electronic service of process, however, makes clear that the requirement of the
physical connection may be arbitrary and unnecessary.
Due process requirements, which ensure that a defendant receives adequate
notice of a pending action, may already accommodate electronic notice to a
defendant in enumerated situations. As electronic technology advances and email provides increased certitude in confiming actual receipt of notice by a
defendant, it is reasonable to expect that electronic service of process will
present an additional and effective option for serving process. Therefore,
developments in that direction should be encouraged and welcomed.
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